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The term “measurement” in quantum theory (as well as in other physical theories) is ambiguous: It
is used to describe both an experience—e.g., an observation in an experiment—and an interaction
with the system under scrutiny. If doing physics is regarded as a creative activity to develop a
meaningful description of the world, then one has to carefully discriminate between the two notions:
An observer’s account of experience—consitutive to meaning—is hardly expressed exhaustively by
the formal framework of an interaction within one particular theory. We develop a corresponding
perspective onto central terms in quantum mechanics in general, and onto the measurement problem
in particular.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the attempt to close quantum theory to the end of
the observer—to incorporate an observer into the formal
language of the theory—, one encounters problems such
as the measurement problem [1, 2]. The Wigner’s-friend
experiment [3–5] is a manifestation thereof: Wigner mea-
sures his friend who, in turn, measures another system.
The friend supposedly obtains a definite result as he “per-
forms a measurement” while being, at the same time, in
a superposition of states corresponding to two different
results. Wigner’s friend is represented in the formal lan-
guage of quantum mechanics despite carrying some “clas-
sical” (distinguishable) information. Similarly, when one
considers self-measurement scenarios, as in [6], the ob-
server himself gets assigned a state, i.e., a symbol from
the formal language, that he then tries to access in a
measurement—as if Wigner had been his own friend. In
order to obtain a formal contradiction it is, in both cases,
crucial to associate an account of experience (i.e., the
statement to have observed a certain value) with symbols
in a formal language. If the existence of such a formal
account of experience is in doubt, then the formal con-
tradiction is, too.
In this article, we argue against the exhaustive repre-
sentation of accounts of experience in any specific lan-
guage, and, in particular, against the possibility to faith-
fully reduce them to symbols in a formal language. We
examine consequences for doing physics in general, and
for quantum mechanics and its measurement problem in
particular. Quantum mechanics may be complete insofar
as it provides a description for any system. This descrip-
tion is, however, not necessarily exhaustive inasmuch as it
contains anything that can be said about that system, or
anything an observer associated with that system might
say.
The outline of this article is as follows: In Section II, we
characterize the epistemological role of the observer and
isolate the crucial qualification of a measurement result
as having been “observed.” In Section III, we review
arguments against the possibility of a reduction of such
a predicate to atomic rules of a formal language. The
resulting scepticism has consequences on how one regards
the concepts of states, systems, and the role of the Born
rule in quantum mechanics, as discussed in Section IV.
In Section V, we examine the measurement problem from
the perspective developed in the preceding sections.
II. THEORIES, SENTENCES, EXPERIENCE
The starting point of our considerations are the following
two characteristics which we regard as necessary (albeit
not sufficient) for doing physics :
(C1) Physics strives for a formal description of the
world.
(C2) Experience serves as its final, normative authority.
Concerning Characteristic (C2): Within physics, one
rarely refers to experience but rather to observations.
We take an observation to be a special kind of experience,
e.g., verifiable in some sense. Hence, any conclusion valid
for experiences applies to observations. In the following
we attempt, to establish a notion of formal description
and to isolate the account of observation. In Section III,
we address the question whether the program of formal-
ization can be carried through to include the account
of observation. In contrast to, e.g., [7], we do not “de-
emphasize the role of language,” but rather return to the
case of the linguistic turn.
A formal language is a set of sentences P ⊂ S∗, with S∗
being the Kleene closure (the set of all finite strings or
concatenations) of an alphabet S, that are syntactically
correct with respect to a set of rules R.1 The relation be-
tween observations and a formal language T = (S,R, P )
is of the following kind [9]:
1 Tarski similarly characterizes “formalized language” in [8] and
remarks the additional structure for “formalized deductive sci-
ences,” where the rules are specified by axioms and deductive
rules.
2If I have observed x, I deem a formal lan-
guage T which forbade the observation of x
untenable.
If, for instance, in two subsequent identical quantum
measurements, one observed different values, quantum
mechanics, T qm = (Sqm, Rqm, P qm), would be contra-
dicted: There are no quantum states and measurement
operators that could, within the postulates of quantum
mechanics, account for the corresponding result (x1, x2)
with x1 6= x2. The elements in Sqm together with rules
in Rqm do not allow to conclude that x may be observed
for either there is no such sentence in P qm or an associ-
ated probability weight is zero.
Let T = (S,R, P ) be the formal language of some
theory. In order to formally characterize the sen-
tences that falsify T , we now consider statements re-
stricted to a context : We assume a formal language
T con = (Scon, Rcon, P con) whose syntactically correct
sentences p ∈ P con refer to possible results observable for
a given context, i.e., experimental setup. Furthermore,
we assume that the formal language T can be restricted
to some T ′ such that the corresponding sentences P ′ are
the subset of P con of sentences that T can account for.
For T to be falsifiable in a context T con, the set of sen-
tences P ′ has to be a proper subset of P con. We can
derive a formal language T fal from T ′ and T con with
all sentences about the experimental context that con-
tradict T as illustrated in Figure 1. If we considered a
sentence in P fal true, then T would be falsified for the
given context. In the previous example of two identical
subsequent quantum measurements, the result (x1, x2)
with x1 6= x2 corresponds to a sentence in P fal.
Falsification refers to theories, including semantic con-
cepts beyond a formal language, rather than to the formal
language directly.2 The semantic concepts are delegated
to the condition “I have observed x,” which we now turn
to.
Ultimately, sentences are to be gauged by experience
according to Characteristic (C2). Let vO : P
con →
{true, false} be a function—the so-called verification
function—, for which vO(p) = true if and only if the
observer O has observed p. More specifically, if vO(p) =
true then O deems some apparatus fit to produce values
in the context M, and O is certain to have obtained the
value p. The verification function establishes whether
the condition “I have observed p” is satisfied or not.
Thus, for O, T is falsified for the context P con if there
exists p ∈ P fal with vO(p) = true.
The reasoning about a formal language T is indepen-
dent of the particular observer—it transcends single ob-
servers: Any observer, upon knowing the formal lan-
guage T , can conclude for all sentences p ∈ P con whether
they are in P fal or not and, hence, whether they fal-
sify T or not. The rules R are, therefore, required not to
2 Popper in [9] refers to “empirical-scientific systems.”
P
P falP ′
P con
Figure 1. Among all the syntactically correct sentences P con
about the experimental context, the sentences in P ′ are con-
tained in the formal language T = (S, P,R), whereas the ones
in P fal contradict T .
depend on observations, qualified by a—subjective, as ar-
gued below—verification function. A theory in this sense
is not statistical learning; thus, our approach differs from
the one in [10].3
Can the verification function be reduced to
“atomic” (i.e., not further reducible) symbols and
thus gain a similar observer-independent status? Is
there a “single language sufficient to state all the truths
there are to state” [11]?4 In Section III, we address
these questions.
III. REDUCIBLE OR NOT?
In the following, we argue that accounts of experience
cannot be exhaustively expressed in a formal language.
In a first step, we examine how limits on formal languages
restrict a formalizability of the verification function (see
Section IIIA). Even if one removes the restriction to for-
mal languages: There remain arguments against the ex-
istence of a privileged language that reveals the one truth
(see Sections III B and III C).
In analogy to an observation by Putnam,5 it should be
noted that the subsequent arguments do not constitute
a proof of impossibility. We aim to show that the belief
that there is one language that unveils the unique truth,
3 The symbols in S and the rules R allow to deduce all sentences
in S that T accounts for independently of the prior observations
such as a history in the observer graph in [10].
4 In [11], Rorty characterizes reductionism as the attempt to find
such a language.
5 “Reichenbach, Carnap, Hempel, and Sellars gave principled rea-
sons why a finite translation of material-thing language into
sense-datum language was impossible. Even if these reasons fall
short of a strict mathematical impossibility proof, they are enor-
mously convincing [. . . ]. In the same spirit, I am going to give
principled reasons why a finite empirical definition of intentional
relations and properties in terms of physical/computational re-
lations and properties is impossible—reasons which fall short of
a strict proof, but which are, I believe, nevertheless convincing.”
[12, §5]
3is merely one of multiple philosophical stances.6 The
readiness to associate symbols in a formal language with
accounts of experience, as is necessary in formulating the
measurement problem, stems from such a belief. Though
not logically excluded, such a belief is in tension with an
essential idea of empirical sciences7—and, as we argue
below, an idea of how meaning comes about: No theory
can claim for itself to have exhaustively captured an ob-
server’s account of experience, while it draws legitimacy
from experimental findings. Should not, instead, the role
of an ironic [13] appeal to the (quantum) theorist, always
doubtful towards one’s final vocabulary?
A. The limits of formal languages
Self-reference imposes limitations on formal languages.
Problems arising from self-reference crystallize, e.g., in
the Liar’s antinomy:
This sentence is false.
The sentence is self-contradictory because a statement is
true if and only if the claim that the statement be true
is true. This particular unquotation notion of truth—
illustrated by: “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow
is white—is called Schema T [15]. For a truth predi-
cate T and with 〈·〉 denoting the name of a sentence, it
can be written as
φ↔ T 〈φ〉, ∀ sentences φ .
With the theorem on the undefinability of truth, Tarski
showed that any formal language extending first-order
arithmetic8 with a truth predicate containing Schema T
allows for such a contradiction. Self-reference, together
with a negation, thwarts the unification of different lin-
guistic contexts as a consistent truth predicate requires
a meta-language.
The verification function above serves as a predicate.
If it is formalized in a theory extending first-order arith-
metics, we require it to contain the Schema T, and no
sentences of the formal language are excluded from aris-
ing from observation, then there is a liar’s antinomy.
There are three escape routes: (1) Either nature mirac-
ulously removes all problematic sentences, and leaves us
6 The arguments given here might not resonate easily: If one ad-
heres to the belief that there exists a privileged language access-
ing the truth, then probably one does not believe the statement
that there is no privileged language would be a true sentence of
that language. On the contrary: The latter statement is then
easily dismissed. This shows the contingency of language—the
incapability to step outside language, or into some meta-language
that allows an innocent view on all languages [13, 14].
7 See (C2).
8 A first-order arithmetic is an axiomatic system for the arithmetic
of natural numbers relying merely on statements of first-order
logic.
with an incomplete formal language in which certain syn-
tactically correct sentences are excluded by assumption,
or (2) we can run into glitches in our experience that we
cannot account for without contradiction, undermining
our confidence in experience as the appropriate norma-
tive authority (see also the reliability constraint in [16,
2B]), or (3) we avoid the reference to sentences within
that language. Tarski follows the latter path: He con-
fines the definition of truth to languages that are not
semantically closed—languages that do not refer to their
own sentences. The definition of a truth predicate then
becomes part of an expanded metalanguage. Following
Tarski’s path, we have to accept a dualism before ad-
dressing the problematic dualism between states and the
statistics of measurement results in quantum mechanics.
B. Semantic holism
The argument of semantic holism has been turned
against the existence of any fundamental dualism. Quine
turns against the dogma of reductionism—“the belief
that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some
logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate
experience” [17]: In a first step, he argues for a “con-
firmation holism”—based on the observation “that ex-
perience can confirm or refute only a whole system of
knowledge” [18].9 By means of a confirmation theory of
meaning, this entails semantic holism: “If a statement
cannot be confirmed in isolation, it does not have mean-
ing in isolation either” [18]. Gonseth observes that in
light of semantic holism, no parts of language, not even
logic, can be exempt from revision.10
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus [14] (see
also [19]) shows similar holistic traits: If one joins the
dots, a dense network of relations between terms emerges,
but no ultimate explanation. Wittgenstein exposes the
“misunderstanding of the logic of our language” [14] in-
directly. He concludes:
My propositions are elucidatory in this way:
he who understands me finally recognizes
them as senseless, when he has climbed out
through them, on them, over them. (He must
so to speak throw away the ladder, after he
has climbed up on it.) He must surmount
these propositions; then he sees the world
rightly. [14, §6.53]
So, how does meaning come about then? In [20], after
“surmounting these propositions,” Wittgenstein exam-
ines the root of first words considering language games
9 The idea does not only originate from Quine; he rather develops
Duhem’s holism further [18].
10 The principle of revision, one of four pillars of Gonseth’s open
philosophy, says “that every position and every scientific state-
ment, including statements of logic, can be revised” [18].
4meaning
account of experience
Figure 2. The circular dependency of meaning and the ac-
count of experience, eventually, calls into question any reduc-
tion to atoms.
(“Sprachspiele”): For a child, that has no medium to
establish meaning from explanation11, the acquisition of
language reduces to trimming12. This process, in turn,
relies on observation. There is an issue of self-reference
at the very root of meaning—or at the very root of any
account of experience for that matter: Whenever one at-
tempts to reduce language to some atomic propositions
or first words, one is faced with a problem of circular
dependence. Meaning and experience are intricately in-
tertwined (see Figure 2).
C. No privileged language
Wittgenstein’s observations have been extended to ar-
gue against the existence of distinguished sentences that
directly correspond to sensory input—atomic sentences
whose meaning cannot be analyzed further:13 Sellars ar-
gues, “as a first step in a general critique of the entire
framework of givenness” [22, §1]: Sense-datum theories
are faced with an inconsistent triad, stemming from a
concept of sensation as “inner episodes [. . . ] without any
prior learning or concept formation” [22, §7] and “inner
episodes which are non-inferential knowings that certain
items are, for example, red or C# [the musical note] and
that these episodes are the necessary conditions of em-
pirical knowledge as providing the evidence for all other
empirical propositions” [22, §7].
Putnam argues against the existence of exhaustive cri-
teria that determine reference or representation: Does an
ant’s incidental “picture of Churchill” in the sand refer to
Churchill? Similarity to the features of Churchill is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient to refer to Churchill (see [23,
§1]). Magritte’s “Treachery of Images” exposes similar
11 “Man muss schon etwas wissen (oder ko¨nnen), um nach der Be-
nennung fragen zu ko¨nnen. Aber was muss man wissen?” [20,
§30]
12 “Das Lehren der Sprache ist hier [fu¨r das Kind] kein Erkla¨ren,
sondern ein Abrichten.” [20, §5]
13 Similar thoughts have been expressed by Nietzsche before: “Ein
Maler, dem die Ha¨nde fehlen und der durch Gesang das ihm
vorschwebende Bild ausdru¨cken wollte, wird immer noch mehr
bei dieser Vertauschung der Spha¨ren verrathen, als die empirische
Welt vom Wesen der Dinge verra¨th. Selbst das Verha¨ltnis eines
Nervenreizes zu dem hervorgebrachten Bilde ist an sich noch kein
nothwendiges; [. . . ] [D]as Hart- und Starr-Werden einer Meta-
pher verbu¨rgt durchaus nichts fu¨r die Notwendigkeit und auss-
chliessliche Berechtigung dieser Metapher.” [21, p.18]
ambiguities: Foucault distinguishes in his discussion of
Magritte’s references to a pipe [24] similitude and re-
semblance, and regards the painter to bring “the former
into play against the latter” [24, §5].14 This leads to
the question: “If lines in the sand, noises, etc., cannot
‘in themselves’, represent anything, then how is it that
thought forms can ‘in themselves’ represent anything?”
[23, §1]15
The assumption of innate, non-contextual semantic
structures, an underlying lingua mentis that allows to
deduce any semantics if deciphered correctly is contested.
The existence of any one true and exhaustive language is
in doubt. And so are distinguished means to express the
verification function vO, be they formal or not. The argu-
ment is not against a world out there, but against a truth
out there—a truth entirely beyond our creation [13].
IV. SYSTEMS, STATES, AND THE BORN RULE
The hope of escaping the perils of practical activity and
achieve ultimate certainty [26] is prevalent among quan-
tum theorists.16 This has effects on the use and meaning
of terms.17 In the following, terms central to quantum
mechanics will briefly be discussed.
A. State and system
As Wittgenstein observes, the meaning of terms is spec-
ified and modified while—not prior to—being used. In
this sense, the words “state” and “system” are not as
clear and static as often insinuated in scientific prac-
tice:18 This foundation for explanatory constructs might
be shakier than it appears at first sight.
Whereas in classical mechanics, a system and its state
are both characterized by directly measurable quantities,
the matter gets more intricate in quantum mechanics:
14 “Resemblance presupposes a primary reference that prescribes
and classes. [. . . ] Resemblance serves representation, which rules
over it; similitude serves repetition, which ranges across it.” [24,
§5]
15 “It seems perfectly clear, at least since Wittgenstein and Sellars,
that the ‘meaning’ of typographical inscription is not an extra
‘immaterial’ property they have, but just their place in a context
of surrounding events in a language-game, in a form of life. This
goes for brain-inscriptions as well.” [25, §1.2]
16 The recent commotion about statements that suggest that quan-
tum mechanics is inconsistent exemplify this attitude [2, 27].
17 “As Wittgenstein often pointed out, a philosophical problem is
typically generated in this way: certain assumptions are made
which are taken for granted by all sides in the subsequent dis-
cussion.” [12, §2]
18 Van Fraassen, in [28], emphasizes the change of the use of words
like “atom”, “electron” or “field” to conclude: “Thus, scientific
revolutions, and even evolutions, embarrass the standard scien-
tific realist” [28].
5Grete Hermann refers to quantum states as “new sym-
bols that express the mutual dependency of the deter-
minability of different measurements”19. It seems rea-
sonable to emphasize the semiotic character of the state:
Symbols of a formal language T , though they might be
called states, are, a priori, not endowed with any further
meaning than to serve as signs.20 Gleason’s theorem [31]
sheds a new light onto the quantum state and shifts the
semiotic character to measurements represented by sets
of orthogonal projectors on a (finite-dimensional) Hilbert
space: The theorem states that any measure µ for pro-
jectors on a Hilbert space of dimension greater than two,
satisfying an additivity constraint for orthogonal projec-
tors,
µ
(∑
i
Pi
)
=
∑
i
µ(Pi)
as well as the constraints
µ(0) = 0 µ(1) = 1
is of the form
µ (P ) = Tr(Pρ)
with ρ being a positive trace-1 operator, i.e., a density
matrix. A theory that represents measurements with sets
of orthogonal projectors as above cannot bear a mea-
sure µ with a range {0, 1}, as expected from a model
assigning definite and non-contextual values to its mea-
surement operators [32, 33]. The way back to a simple
association of states and measurement results as in clas-
sical mechanics is barred by non-locality [29, 34] and con-
textuality [35].
B. Born rule
As demanded in Section II, any physical theory has to
yield assertions as to which results are not expected to
be observed. In classical mechanics, measurable entities
have a one-to-one correspondence to states. The situ-
ation in quantum mechanics is more intricate, as there
is no immediate correspondence between observed enti-
ties and state symbols: The Born rule bridges between
these separate realms. At first sight, the need of such
a bridge seems unfortunate as it manifests the separa-
tion of a realm of observable entities from the realm of
19 “Im Gegensatz dazu [Zusta¨nde der klassischen Physik] braucht
der quantenmechanische Formalismus zur Zustandsbeschreibung
neuartige Symbole, die die gegenseitige Abha¨ngigkeit in der Bes-
timmbarkeit verschiedener Gro¨ßen zum Ausdruck bringt.” [29]
20 “There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum
mechanical description. It is wrong to think that the task of
physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we
can say about Nature.” [Bohr as quoted in 30]
states. Together with a model of the measurement pro-
cess, the Born rule leads to issues such as the measure-
ment problem. On a closer look, however, fundamental
theories seem to require a formal framework that con-
nects to information: The core of Popper’s argument
for a fundamental indeterminism in classical mechanics
(C) in [36] evolves around the observation that the only
means of extracting information from a system in classi-
cal mechanics—without going beyond classical mechan-
ics in the measurement process—involves introducing un-
traceable disturbances. The underlying assumption is: In
order to extract any information, there has to be an inter-
action.21 The problem in classical mechanics is usually
tamed by describing the measurement in another the-
ory T ′: For instance, optical measurement devices may
determine the position of a system otherwise described
by classical mechanics. The disturbance due to the inter-
action captured in T ′ may be assumed to be small. Then
the error one has to tolerate before falsifying C or T ′
is small. (In contrast to this, Popper’s observation of
a fundamental indeterminism relates to necessarily large
errors.) In this light, the possibility of measuring an en-
tity “without in any way disturbing a system” [38] is not
a feature of classical mechanics alone—optics (or another
external theory) is necessary to reduce the errors.
In summary, a fundamental theory (not relying on
other theories to capture an interaction necessary to
extract information) has to model the emergence of
information—potentially exposing it to a measurement
problem.
V. THE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM
The above considerations have repercussions on the mea-
surement problem. In the proceeding, we illustrate the
problem with the Wigner’s-friend experiment. A dis-
cussion of Maudlin’s reading [1] of the problem can be
found in Appendix A. Breuer’s approach [6] to self-
reference issues in quantum mechanics in is examined in
Appendix B.
The measurement problem roots in the irreconcilabil-
ity of distinguishability of information and linearity in
quantum theory [2]. The problem can be illustrated
with a Wigner’s-friend experiment as depicted in Fig-
ure 3. Employing references to states—despite the above
criticism—, the problem can be put as follows: A source
21 Bohr anticipated this observation: “Indeed the finite interaction
between object and measuring agencies conditioned by the very
existence of the quantum of action entails—because of the impos-
sibility of controlling the reaction of the object on the measuring
instruments if these are to serve their purpose—the necessity of a
final renunciation of the classical ideal of causality and a radical
revision of our attitude towards the problem of physical reality”
[37].
6S MF MW
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|φ〉
Figure 3. The Wigner’s-friend experiment.
emits a system in a state
|φ〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
∈ HS .
This state is then measured by an observer, called
Wigner’s friend, and modelled by a quantum system with
Hilbert space HF , in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}. Finally, Wigner
himself measures the joint system HS ⊗HF in a basis{ |0〉S |0〉F + |1〉S |1〉F√
2
,
|0〉S |0〉F − |1〉S |1〉F√
2
, . . .
}
.
Within Everett’s relative-state formalism Q of quantum
mechanics [39]22, the joint system HS ⊗ HF after the
friend’s measurement is in a state
V (|φ〉S) = 1√
2
(
V (|0〉S) + V (|1〉S)
)
=
1√
2
(|0〉S ⊗ |0〉F + |1〉S ⊗ |1〉F ) ,
where V is the isometry modelling the measurement of
the friend [2]. Thus, Wigner’s final measurement yields
the eigenvalue, corresponding to the first basis vector
with probability 1.
Besides the relative-state formalism Q, one might con-
sider the scenario in a formalism QC with a “collapse.”
Within QC , a system is either isolated and evolves unitar-
ily according to the Schro¨dinger equation, or it interacts
with its environment. A measurement is such an interac-
tion and entails a collapse to the eigenvector associated
with the measurement result. In QC , the measurement
of the friend reduces to a unitary within the system un-
der consideration by Wigner: Environment is a subjec-
tive concept, depending on what an observer considers
as the system to be measured. The system associated
with HS ⊗ HF measured by Wigner is isolated from his
perspective as long as he measures the entire joint sys-
tem: The friend’s “measurement” is not an interaction
with the environment relative to Wigner, but an inter-
action within an isolated system. Thus, QC yields pre-
dictions on the outcome of Wigner’s final measurement
identical to those of Q.
22 Here, we do not refer to the many-worlds interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics. We want to emphasize not to confuse the for-
malism with an interpretation [40].
In a third formalism with an objective collapse QOC ,
the joint system HS⊗HF collapses, after the interaction
modelled by the isometry V above conditioned on the
obtained result. Importantly, this collapse is happening
independently of the observer, not merely subjectively—
that is, it has to be considered also by Wigner (simi-
larly to “GRW” [41]). For Wigner, who does not know
the result of the friend’s measurement, the entangled
state V (|φ〉) collapses to a mixture
ρ =
1
2
(|0, 0〉〈0, 0|+ |1, 1〉〈1, 1|) , (1)
and Wigner measures either of two first vectors in the
basis above with equal probability.
So, the question is: Does a measurement within a
closed system induce a collapse as modelled in QOC?
The Wigner’s-friend setup allows to empirically test this
question and destinguish QOC from Q/QC.
The precise meaning of the term “measurement” is cru-
cial in the above considerations: In Q, any measurement
is primarily a unitary, entangling the observed system
with a memory system which includes the observer into
the framework. Even though a symbol in the formal lan-
guage is assigned a tag “the observer’s memory,” there
is no simple correspondence to an “observer” in a dis-
course of ordinary language surrounding an experiment.
The Born rule is then applied to the memory system of
the respective observer, after tracing out all other sys-
tems. In QC , the measurement is a notion relative to the
system that is to be measured.23 Any interaction that
involves a part of the environment relative to this system
can be considered a measurement and induces a collapse.
On the one hand, a system is called isolated if there are
no such interactions: Then, the evolution is a unitary op-
erator. As long as the perception of an “isolated system”
on one side and a “measurement” or “interaction with
the environment” on the other are clearly separated and
mutually exclusive, this is a consistent framework. Note
that the friend’s measurement is not a measurement rel-
ative to Wigner.
If Q and QC were falsified in a Wigner’s-friend exper-
iment, and we were left with QOC , the situation would
be intricate: The relative character of the two other for-
malisms is lost, as there is an “objective collapse.” Then,
an interaction with the environment or an associated dis-
sipation of information is not a necessary requirement for
a collapse. An isolated system would then show a non-
unitary evolution. If the friend shared his result with
Wigner, he would dissipate information into Wigner’s
environment, and, thus, we would again be in a case
consistent with Q and QC . But can we establish that
a measurement has happened without revealing the re-
sult? One might assume that the friend’s memory was
23 This relativity is reflected in the partial trace in Q, which is rela-
tive to the memory of the respective observer, and in the unitary
entangling the observed system with the observers memory.
7in an initial state |∆〉 orthogonal to both |0〉 and |1〉 and
there was a unitary operator U with
U : HM ⊗HS → HM ⊗HS
|∆〉 ⊗ |k〉 7→ |k〉 ⊗ |k〉 ∀k = 1, . . . , k.
for an orthonormal basis {|k〉}k. Then, a positive
operator-valued measurement (POVM) could determine
whether the memory was still in the initial state or not
without revealing the actual result. If we were to build
a consistent theory, then any other unitary of the same
form as U should induce a collapse. With this, quantum
mechanics as we know it would eventually—collapse.
In conclusion, the meaning of “measurement” is cru-
cial to both Q and QC : Different uses of the term—
formal ones on the level of the theory, ordinary ones, dif-
ferent relative ones—are not to be simply equated. The
measurement as an account of observation—and thus of
experience—does not have a direct correspondence to an
interaction expressed in the formal language of a theory:
The measurement problem is a semantic confusion.24
VI. CONCLUSION
Leibniz’ reservation against space-time forming a fixed
stage25 has its linguistic analogue: Wittgenstein’s ob-
servation on the intricate and circular dependency of
meaning and experience lead him to conclude that mean-
ing derives from the use of language. These considera-
tions on the plasticity of language have been extended
by, e.g., Quine’s arguments for semantic holism or Put-
nam’s reflections on reference and representation, and
lead, eventually, to doubting the existence of a privileged
language—a “semantic stage”—for accounts of experi-
ence: Meaning arises along the discourse, not prior to it.
There is, consequently, no objective language to exhaus-
tively represent an observer’s account of experience.
Reducing an “observer” to a “system” or a “measure-
ment” as sensory perception to “measurement” as part of
a formalism are light-footed extensions of the terms’ use
in physics. In the face of the intricate relation between
language and experience, as well as the normative au-
thority of experience, it is debatable to “interchangeably
use the words ‘experience’, ‘observation,’ and ‘state of the
observer’ ” [10]. If an observer is measured, one can say
something—but not necessarily reproduce his account of
sensory evidence.
In summary: If semantic reductionism has limits,
then so does scientific reductionism. It is in the context
of the measurement problem and issues of self-reference
that one runs into these limits.
In light of the absence of an underlying privileged lan-
guage, physics is to shape meaning.
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Appendix A: Maudlin’s reading
Maudlin in [1] reads the measurement problem as the
inconsistency of the following three “claims:”
1.A The wave-function of a system is complete, i.e., the
wave function specifies (directly or indirectly) all
the physical properties of a system.
1.B The wave-function always evolves in accord with
a linear dynamical equation (e.g., the Schro¨dinger
equation).
1.C Measurements of, e.g., the spin of an electron al-
ways (or at least usually) have determinate out-
comes, i.e., at the end of the measurement the mea-
suring device is either in a state which indicates
spin up (and not down) or down (and not up).
To show the inconsistency, Maudlin considers, in addi-
tion to a two-dimensional observed system, a measure-
ment apparatus. The argument is then: By linearity,
the apparatus should be in a superposition of its pointer
states “up” and “down” if the measured system is in
a superposition with respect to the measurement basis
(by (1.A) and (1.B)). According to (1.C), on the con-
trary, the pointer of the apparatus should be exclusively
in a state “up” or “down.”
The commitment to the above “claims” can, however,
be questioned as discussed below. Thus, for running into
Maudlin’s contradiction, one has to take a specific stance,
namely assuming the sufficient representation of accounts
by formal symbols possible. The resulting categoriza-
tion of interpretations—by the choice of which claim to
drop—is similarly subjective.
9The completeness claim (1.A) does not specify what is
to be considered a “physical property.” Is it “what can
be measured”? Or “what can be assigned a symbol in the
formal language of a physical theory”? It seems we are
faced with similar problems as with what is to be consid-
ered a “physical system.” For the inconsistency to arise,
accounts of experience are to be regarded as a “physical
property.” The last claim, (1.C), does not only state that
measurements have determinate results, but it specifies
these in terms of states of a measuring device. If one
takes the requirement of “determinate measurement re-
sults” to be the capability to meaningfully assert “I have
observed ‘up’ and not ‘down’ ” (or vice versa)—that is,
to attribute “empirical content” to such a statement—
it does not necessarily follow that the state of some ap-
paratus is exclusively in a correspondent state “up” or
“down.” One may include an apparatus into the for-
mal framework and assume that then, the apparatus is
being measured. Assuming the interaction between the
observed system and the apparatus to be an entangling
unitary means that the result of a measurement of the
system and the result of a measurement of the apparatus
have correlated results.
In a similar manner, further apparatuses “between”
the observed system and the observer, who then reports
on his experience, might be included. One can even go
as far as to assign a quantum state to the brain or mem-
ory of the observer—as we do above in connection with
the relative-state formalism. There are, however, doubts
as to whether the assigned state—or any symbol in any
other formal language—exhaustively captures the mean-
ing of an account as the one above. If one follows, e.g.,
Quine’s arguments on semantic holism, or Putnam’s re-
flections on reference, such a “representational complete-
ness [of the wave-function]” [1] seems out of reach: There
is then a gap for any formal language due to issues of se-
mantics. This semantic gap is wider than what a Born
rule can bridge.
The second claim, (1.B), states the linearity of quan-
tum mechanics and refers to the Schro¨dinger equation,
as an example for such an evolution. The Schro¨dinger
equation does not hold unconditionally, but merely under
the restriction to closed or isolated systems. The claim
that “the traditional theory did not [. . . ] state in clear
physical terms, the conditions under which the non-linear
evolution takes place” [1] cannot be sustained if “isolated
systems” is enough of a “clear physical term.” As ar-
gued above, the distinction between closed systems and
systems interacting with their environment, e.g., during
a measurement, is crucial in avoiding inconsistencies.
There is yet another intricacy: If the system is iso-
lated, then, according to the Schro¨dinger equation, the
system evolves unitarily. A system that interacts with
its environment, i.e., that is not isolated, evolves linearly
according to some CPTP map. This is the case for the
formalism QOC above: There is a CPTP map so that
V (|φ〉S) 7→ ρ ,
where ρ is the density matrix in (1).26 The divergence of
the measurement probabilities for Wigner in QOC from
the ones in Q and QC occurs already with a non-unitary,
merely linear, evolution.
In light of the discussion in the previous chapters, a
“new physics” that provides a “real solution” [1], maybe
even a realistic solution, seems forlorn a hope.
Appendix B: Quantum self-reference
In [6], Breuer investigates problems of self-reference in
quantum mechanics. The approach relies on incorporat-
ing propositions and semantics into the formal language
of quantum mechanics, and thus stands in contrast to
the argumentation in Section III above. Subsequently,
the steps towards such an incorporation are examined in
greater detail.
In a first step, the framework of propositions P , corre-
sponding to sentences about an experimental context we
discuss in Section II, is incorporated into T .
Propositions about physical systems can be
reformulated by saying ‘The state of the sys-
tem has this and that property.’ So instead of
speaking of propositions, we can equally well
speak about sets of states: to each proposi-
tion there corresponds the set of states for
which the proposition is true. [6]
Propositions can be expressed in some formal language
T con as done in Section II. As such, there is little to
object to incorporating T con and T into some T ′. The
reduction of T con into T is, however, problematic. Let
us take S to be the set of state symbols. Then, the
reduction proposed above can be regarded as a func-
tion f : P con → P(S), assigning each proposition a set of
states. To speak “equally well” about sets of states, we
require f to be injective. The set of falsifying proposi-
tions, f−1(∅), has then a cardinality of one. This poses a
caveat to falsifiability: If single sentences have no inher-
ent meaning, then how can one meaningfully assert that
the theory was contradicted?
One could allow for ordinary language to fill the void.
This is not an option in the context of [6], as ordinary
language is meant to be reduced to T as well.
So good experiments serve to at least par-
tially constitute the semantics of physical the-
ories. In this sense, observation is a semantic
concept. [6]
In light of the circular dependency of the account of ex-
perience and semantics discussed above, observation is a
26 The partial trace of an isometry V ′ : |l, l〉SF 7→ |l, l, l〉SFG mod-
elling a second measurement of the friend in the same basis with
a memory outside the control of Wigner, yields such a CPTP
map.
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semantic concept. An observation, however, is neither
to be equated with an experiment nor with a formalism
of “measurement” within T , for reasons discussed in Sec-
tion III. Thus, the formal language of quantummechanics
is not semantically closed, as concluded in the following
statement.
Tarski (1956, 1969) calls a language seman-
tically closed if it contains (1) semantic con-
cepts and (2) expressions referring to its own
propositions. The language of a physical the-
ory can be closed semantically: If apparatus
and object system, as well as their interac-
tion, can be described by the theory, then the
semantic concept of observation can be intro-
duced into the language of the theory. [6]
In conclusion: One may doubt whether the reduction
of the linguistic context, including the observer and his
account of experience, to the formalism of quantum me-
chanics is feasible. Consequently, an important premise
for the arguments in [6] is in question.
